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AN ECONOMIC AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TWO 
VIEWS OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN 
AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 
By, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt 
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt is a Willard and Margaret Carr Professor of Labor and Employment Law at Indiana 
University Maurer School of Law. Professor Dau-Schmidt is a nationally recognized teacher and scholar on 
the subjects of labor and employment law and the economic analysis of legal problems. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt is author of seven books and numerous articles on labor and employment law 
and the economic analysis of law, and he frequently presents papers at academic conferences and law 
schools across the United States, Canada, Europe and Asia. In 1990 he received the Scholarly Paper 
Award from the Association of American Law Schools for his work on the economic analysis of the 
criminal law as a preference-shaping policy.  Professor Dau-Schmidt is active in law school 
administration, most recently serving as Associate Dean of Faculty Research. Involved in several 
national academic associations, Professor Dau-Schmidt was elected to the National Council of the 
American Association of University Professors and appointed to serve on the executive and litigation 
committees of that organization. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt has been invited to teach at various European and Asian universities, including 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität in Kiel, Germany; Friedrich-Alexander-Universität in Erlangen, 
Germany; and Universität Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) in Paris. 
Professor Dau-Schmidt holds a Ph.D. in economics, J.D. and M.A. in economics from the University of 
Michigan, and a B.A. in economics and political science from the University of Wisconsin. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are two divergent views on the role of public sector collective bargaining in 
American law.  The first is that public sector collective bargaining undermines 
democratic government, allowing organized employees to interfere with the 
administration of the law for their own personal benefit at the expense of the 
general population and taxpayer.[1] Under this view, courts have characterized 
public sector collective bargaining as an unconstitutional interference with 
freedom of contract or an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.[2] In 
legislative and policy debates the detractors argue that unions are merely “labor 
cartels” that are both inefficient and inequitable, raising wages and benefits at the 
expense of consumers and taxpayers and imposing inefficient and inflexible work 
rules.[3] 
The second view is that public sector collective bargaining is an essential part of 
democratic government.  Under this view, collective bargaining is a fundamental 
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human right[4] included in our cherished constitutional rights of free speech and 
association,[5] and an essential counterbalance to corporate interests in a 
pluralistic society.[6] Supporters would argue that, on the whole, public sector 
collective bargaining improves democratic outcomes and government 
administration by giving workers a voice in the outcome[7] which improves the 
provision of government services and the administration of the law.[8] Public 
sector unions represent important public policy interests in collective bargaining 
and legislative lobbying and act as a check on government monopsony power in 
employment.[9] Moreover, unions, in both the private and the public sectors, 
foster a healthy middle class, promote greater equality in the distribution of 
income, and promote the representation of the views of workers in legislative 
debates.[10] 
Many of the broader claims of these two views are subject to empirical 
analysis.  One of the points of public sector unions is to raise employee wages and 
benefits over what they would have been in the absence of a union; but are they 
raised above comparable levels in the private sector at the expense of taxpayers, or 
do they promote comparable wages that attract good public servants and long-run 
administrative interests rather than short-term budget cutting interests?  Do 
public sector unions impose work rules and restrictions that interfere with the 
provision of government services, or do they provide an employee voice that 
improves government services and the administration of the law?  In this essay, I 
will present an outline of the economic arguments both for and against public 
sector unions, and the empirical evidence supporting or refuting those 
arguments.  My intent is to provide an empirical context for the larger debate 
regarding public policy with respect to public sector collective bargaining and the 
larger constitutional debate over this institution. 
  II. PRIMER ON THE STATE AS AN ECONOMICALLY RATIONAL 
EMPLOYER: DIFFERENT IS GOOD, AND EXPECTED! 
Regardless of whether public employees are organized or not, economic theory 
suggests that there should be some predictable differences between the terms and 
conditions of employment between the typical public sector employee and the 
typical private sector employee, given the requirements of most government jobs 
and various characteristics of the government as an employer. 
First, there are important demographic differences between public and private 
employees that have to be taken into account in accurately comparing their relative 
compensation.  As shown in Table 1, on average, public employees have more years 
of education, more years of experience (age), work fewer hours and are more likely 
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to be female or Black (but not Hispanic) than private sector employees. It is vital 
to take account of the educational differences between public and private sector 
workers in comparing their wages and benefits.  Many government jobs require a 
bachelor’s degree or an advanced or professional degree in order to competently 
do the job.[11] As a result, while only 25 to 30 percent of private sector employees 
have at least a bachelor’s degree, over half of public employees have at least a 
bachelor’s degree.[12] In order to recruit educated people into public sector jobs, 
these employees have to be compensated for their investment in 
education,[13] and thus one would expect that, because government workers are 
more educated, on average, than private sector employees, they should be paid 
more, on average, than private sector employees.[14] Similarly, one should also 
take account of the fact that, on average, public employees work fewer hours and 
currently have more years of work experience than private sector 
employees.  Finally, although theoretically there should be no difference in 
compensation based on gender, race or ethnicity, historically women and minority 
groups have done better in public employment.  It is at least interesting to control 
for systematic differences between private and public compensation based on 
these factors, although in this case lower wages in the private sector may be an 
indicia of discrimination based on gender or race. 
  
TABLE 1: Characteristics of Private, State and Local Employees (2008 and 2009) 
  
 Private State Local State & Local 
Number (Millions) 103.2 6.0 10.7 16.7 
Education (%) 
Less Than HS 8.5 1.9 2.8 2.5 
High School 31.1 17.9 21.1 19.9 
Some College 30.6 27.1 26.5 26.7 
College Degree 20.9 27.5 27.4 27.4 
Adv Degree 8.9 25.6 22.3 23.5 
Annual Hours 
Worked* 2197 — — 2156 
Median Age (Years) 40 43 44 44 
Women (%) 46.2 59.1 60.8 60.2 
Black (%)** 9.6 13.4 11.5 12.2 (est) 
Hispanic (%)** 17.1 8.3 10.8 9.8 (est) 
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Sources: John Schmitt, The Wage Penalty for State and Local Government Employees, Center 
for Policy Research, 3, tbl. 1 (May 2010) (Analysis of CEPR extract (version 1.5) of 2009 CPS 
ORG; *Jeffrey Keefe, Debunking the Myth of the Overcompensated Public Employee, 
Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #276, at 10, tbl. 5 (Sept 15, 2010) (analysis of 2009 
CPS data for private and public employees); ** Keith A. Bender & John S. Heywood, Out of 
Balance? Comparing Public and Private Sector Compensation over 20 Years, Ctr. for State & 
Local Gov’t Excellence, Nat’l Inst. on Ret. Sec.  7, tbl. 1 (Apr. 2010) (2008 CPS data). 
  
Second, the state is a relatively large employer, and large employers are good at 
bearing risk because they have a large number of employees over which risk can be 
pooled and they enjoy economies of scale in the coverage of risk.[15] As a result, 
large employers can more efficiently offer benefits such as health insurance and 
pensions that insulate employees from risk, and it is predictable that benefits 
would constitute a larger percent of the employees’ compensation package for large 
employers like the state.[16] Because of its relative insulation from market 
fluctuations and its high degree of credit-worthiness, the state is a particularly 
good risk-bearer, even among large employers.  Thus it is predictable that, even in 
comparison with other large employers, the state would offer to bear or insure 
employee risk through the provision of various benefits in exchange for relatively 
lower wages.  Accordingly, one would expect that the typical public employee 
compensation package would include a higher percentage of compensation in 
benefits such as healthcare and pensions, and a lower percent in up front wages, 
in comparison with the compensation packages of typical private employees.[17] 
Third, the demand for government services is more predictable than the demand 
for most private businesses and thus, as an employer, the state probably does not 
place as high a premium on having flexibility to lay off employees as do private 
businesses.  A rational state would want to maintain public employment in hard 
economic times as a counter-cyclical check against recession.[18] Indeed, the 
demand for many government services increases in hard economic times so a state 
might actually want to employ more workers rather than fewer when the economy 
goes bad.  As a result, one would expect that, rationally, the state would want to 
offer job stability to employees in exchange for lower wages, and one would expect 
that state employees would enjoy greater job security than comparable private 
sector employees.[19] Indeed, historically, the necessity of protecting valuable 
state employees and their positions from political cronyism or patronage has 
required strict protection under civil service laws.[20] 
Thus, even in a competitive labor market, without unions or political advocacy, one 
would expect that public employee compensation, including the value of both 
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wages and benefits, would on average be higher than that for all private employees 
(because of the greater average educational requirements of public employment 
jobs), but that the compensation package for public employees would include 
relatively lower wages and higher benefits, including job security, than that for 
private sector employees.  Simple analyses that assume that any difference 
between the compensation packages of public and private employees in either 
amount or wage and benefit mix is a sign of government waste and inefficiency and 
political favoritism are simply wrong.[21] 
III. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND THE TWO VIEWS OF UNIONS AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN ECONOMICS 
A. Public Employee Unions as Labor Cartels and Special Interest Groups 
The simple economic analysis of unions, in either the private or public sector, is 
that they are labor cartels that impose on employers wage demands and other 
terms and conditions of employment that are both inefficient and 
inequitable.[22] Under the simple neo-classical analysis, such labor cartels cause 
inefficient production and consumption, unemployment and a displacement of 
workers from organized work to unorganized work, depressing wages there.  They 
are also inequitable because employee wage increases come at the expense of 
consumers or taxpayers who are not necessarily any wealthier than public 
employees. 
This simple analysis is presented in Figure 1.  Figure 1(a) represents the organized 
labor market where the vertical axis measures the employees’ wages, the horizontal 
axis measures the number of full-time employees employed, the solid downward 
sloping curve labeled D represents the employers’ labor demand curve, and the 
solid upward sloping curve labeled S represents the employees’ labor supply 
curve.  Figure 1(b) represents the unorganized labor market, with analogous 
demand and supply curves.  Prior to the entry of the union, both the organized and 
the unorganized markets are in equilibrium with a competitive wage Wc, a 
competitive level of employment Nc, and supply equals demand (S = 
D).[23] Under the traditional analysis, when the union organizes a sufficient 
number of employees in the relevant product market, it imposes a monopoly wage 
on the employers in the organized market Wu. Barriers to entry prevent the 
organized employers from replacing the employees,[24] and the employer 
responds by moving up his demand curve, reducing employment from Nc to Nu. 
The employer accomplishes this decrease in employment by reducing production 
and substituting capital for labor in the production process, resulting in 
“production inefficiency.”[25] The higher union wage also results in 
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unemployment because more workers (Ns) would like to work at the union wage 
than the employers are willing to employ (Nu). As shown in Figure 1, some of these 
workers (Nc – Nu) seek employment in the unorganized labor market shown in 
Figure 1(b), pushing out the labor supply curve in that market from S to S′ and 
depressing wages from Wc to W′c.[26] Moreover, the decrease in production by 
the organized firms and the increase in the organized employees’ wage results in 
an increase in the product price to the consumer or taxpayer. This results in 
“consumption inefficiency” because the consumers or taxpayers will now buy too 
little of the good relative to other goods.[27] 
Finally, critics argue that public sector unions use political pressure to maintain 
the product market monopoly and pressure public employers to accede to union 
demands.  Drawing on public choice theory, they argue that public employees are 
a narrow interest group that can gain personal benefits at the expense of the larger 
electorate.[28] 




Based on the above analysis, conservatives argue that public employee unions 
impose wages and benefits that are higher than those enjoyed by comparable 
private sector employees who are not organized.  These higher wages and benefits 
raise the cost of government services and cause inefficient production and 
consumption.  These higher wages and benefits are also inequitable because they 
come at the expense of taxpayers who may not be as wealthy as the public 
employees.  Moreover, public employee collective bargaining undermines our 
democratic government by establishing a special interest group with an interest in 
gaining wages and benefits at the expense of ordinary taxpayers.  These special 
interest groups undermine the working of our democratic government because 
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they have a concentrated interest in rent-seeking at the expense of the larger 
electorate’s interest in the efficient provision of government services.  As a solution 
to these problems conservatives have argued that we should prohibit collective 
bargaining in the public sector (and in the private sector too).[29] 
Even before we get to the empirical question of whether public sector employees, 
and in particular organized public employees, are over-paid, there are some logical 
objections that can be raised to the conservative account.  It seems a gross 
exaggeration to say that public sector unions in the United States establish a labor 
cartel that dictates wage and benefit increases.  Even before the recent round of 
state statutes limiting or doing away with collective bargaining rights, only thirty-
four states had comprehensive public sector collective bargaining laws, and only 
eight had statutes allowing any public employees even a limited right to 
strike.[30] There is no right to strike among federal employees,[31] and strikes in 
violation of this stricture have met with wholesale termination of the striking 
federal employees.[32] For the vast majority of American public sector employees, 
if there is any right to collectively bargain, it is more a right to consultation with a 
possible resort to neutral fact-finding or arbitration on disputed topics.  The 
primary benefits to American public employees from collective bargaining are their 
association with other employees with similar interests, a First Amendment right, 
and the opportunity to have signed contracts on their terms and conditions of 
employment that are enforceable for a period of time, generally two to four years—
most often two. 
B.  Employee Voice at Work and in Government 
The neoclassical analysis of unions as labor cartels is logically incomplete and far 
too simple for such a complex phenomenon.  The basic neoclassical analysis 
ignores the benefits of efficient negotiations between the union and the employer 
and the possibility of employer monopsony power.  It would be irrational for the 
union to dictate wages while the employer sets employment; instead, the parties 
should rationally bargain over both wages and employment to reach Pareto 
optimal agreements.[33] In the case of employer monopsony power, collective 
bargaining can move the parties to a more efficient level of wages and 
employment.  Moreover, it has been persuasively argued that collective bargaining 
can raise efficiency by providing a role for employee voice in the production 
process and the negotiation and enforcement of contract terms.[34] Employees, 
especially skilled professional employees like many public employees, can provide 
useful input into the production process and act as useful monitors of management 
performance in the workplace.  Unions can also be useful in negotiating efficient 
contract terms over public goods in the workplace and the enforcement of efficient 
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deals between the employees and the employer over time.  Finally, public employee 
unions can be useful in the political process, representing the benefits of the 
programs in which they work and the under-represented perspective of working 
Americans in general.  As a result, far from simply being an exercise in rent-
seeking, the participation of public sector unions in the political process makes an 
important contribution to pluralism in our democracy.[35] 
  Pareto Optimal Bargaining 
Unless one wants to assume that unions are entirely indifferent to the 
unemployment of their members, the simple depiction of collective bargaining in 
the neoclassical model in which the union sets the wage and the employer responds 
by setting employment will not be Pareto optimal for the parties.  Although the 
employer’s labor demand curve gives the profit maximizing response to a market 
increase in wages, if the wage increase results from the formation of a union that 
can bargain over both wages and employment, the employer and union can 
negotiate a wage and employment agreement that specifies a higher level of 
employment and a lower wage that both the employer and union will prefer to the 
employer’s labor demand response.[36] Indeed, if one assumes that the parties 
bargain to maximize the monetary value of rents and productivity increases due to 
unionization, one can demonstrate that the parties will seek to minimize the 
impact of the union on product price and firm employment levels.[37] 
  Employer Monopsony Power 
Moreover, if the employer enjoys monopsony power in the labor market, it can be 
shown that the formation of a union can actually move the employer to a more 
efficient wage and level of employment through collective bargaining.[38] An 
employer exercises monopsony power when it employs such a significant share of 
the labor in the relevant labor market that it realizes that its wage policies affect 
the market wage.[39] When an employer monopsony exists, the employer no 
longer has to accept the market wage as given, but instead realizes that it can drive 
down the market wage by employing fewer employees. As characterized in Figure 
2, which shows the relevant labor supply curve (S) and the employer’s labor 
demand curve (D) and marginal cost of labor curve (MCL), the monopsonistic 
employer maximizes profits by employing fewer employees (Lm) and driving the 
wage down from Wc to Wm.[40] The actions of the monopsonist in decreasing 
employment and wages results in production inefficiency because the monopsonist 
employs less than the efficient amount of labor in the production process. A union 
can solve this problem because, by fixing the wage for labor at a given rate, it 
prevents the monopsonist from driving down wages by employing fewer workers. 
Because the monopsonist can no longer drive down the wage by cutting 
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employment, the monopsonist no longer has incentive to employ fewer than the 
efficient number of employees.[41] The problem of the negotiation of a wage 
between a monopsony employer and a monopoly union represents an 
indeterminate bargaining problem, but if one assumes the employer and the union 
seek to maximize the monetary value of the rents from their endeavors, they will 
bargain to the competitive wage (Wc) and the competitive level of employment 
(Lc).[42] Thus, when facing employer monopsony power, monopoly unions can 
increase employment and economic efficiency. 
 FIGURE 2:   A Monopsonistic Labor Market 
 
 
  Productivity Enhancing Effects of Unions 
There are also a variety of economic theories under which unions and collective 
bargaining can increase the productivity of the employees and the efficiency of 
their terms and conditions of employment.[43] First, unions can allow employees 
to make useful contributions in organizing the production process and monitoring 
the work of administrators and managers.[44] Employees have an obvious interest 
in the success of their employer and the productivity of their work.   Moreover, 
employees, and in particular skilled or educated employees, have important 
knowledge of the production process that is useful in planning production to make 
the enterprise more successful.[45] Discussions with collective representatives in 
a union setting are more likely to be productive than individual discussions 
because employees will have less fear of retaliation for reporting administrative 
failures. 
Second, unions help to promote the negotiation of efficient contract terms.  Many 
terms and conditions of employment are public goods in that they are the same for 
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all employees and an individual employee cannot negotiate improvements without 
benefiting others. Examples include: common hours of work, the common method 
of evaluation, and the general form of medical or pension benefits.[46] Because 
improvements in these public goods are not exclusive, individual employees have 
too little incentive to negotiate for them, resulting in a contract for employment 
that includes too little of these benefits.  Unions help to solve this problem by 
giving the workers a collective voice through which they can more accurately 
represent their preferences on such matters.[47] There are also terms and 
conditions of employment for which there are important information costs and 
asymmetries, for example, health risks on the job and the expected value of health 
and pension benefits.  Individually, it is very costly for employees to collect all of 
the information necessary to negotiate efficient terms with respect to these 
conditions of employment.[48] Unions help solve this problem by hiring experts 
and taking advantage of economies of scale in collecting and maintain the 
necessary information.[49] 
Third, unions help promote the efficient enforcement of express or implicit 
contracts.  It is often efficient for the employer and employees to make agreements 
that are enforceable over considerable periods of time, for example health and 
pension benefits.  Moreover, in both the private and the public sectors, it is 
common for employers to pay employees less than their marginal product early in 
their careers and more than their marginal product later in their careers.[50] This 
deferred compensation serves important purposes of compensating employees for 
investments in human capital and minimizing employer monitoring 
costs.[51] Unfortunately, such deferred compensation creates incentives for 
employers to act opportunistically and fire employees before they receive their 
deferred wages. Agreements to defer a portion of compensation often remain 
implicit because of the costs of negotiation and enforcement.[52] However, they 
can also be enforced by express terms that discourage the discharge of employees 
later in their careers, for example, seniority agreements and just cause 
clauses.  Unions facilitate the enforcement of such long-term implicit contracts by 
protecting employees from employers’ opportunistic behavior with collective 
action, seniority rules, just-cause provisions, and arbitration provisions.[53] 
Finally, some argue that unions raise productivity by promoting the adjustment of 
working conditions through the efficient expression of a collective voice rather 
than costly exit.[54] In a competitive labor market, a worker’s primary mechanism 
for expressing dissatisfaction with working conditions is to take another job or 
“exit” the firm. Individual bargaining over conditions of employment is difficult 
due to the free-rider effect previously discussed and because workers do not want 
to be identified by their employer as “troublemakers.” However, exit is an 
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inefficient mechanism by which to encourage changes in working condition 
because it does not communicate what was wrong with the job and because it 
imposes search and retraining costs on both the employee and the employer. 
Unions help solve this problem by giving workers a collective voice through which 
they can express dissatisfaction with working conditions without the problems of 
free riding or employer retaliation. Besides being a more effective method of 
expressing dissatisfaction with working conditions, the collective voice also saves 
money by reducing the number of workers who leave jobs and, thus, the amount 
of search and retraining costs. 
  Unions as an Important Part of a Pluralist Democracy 
Last but not least, many have argued that free labor unions are an important part 
of democratic pluralism.  Not only do free people, including public sector 
employees, have the right to organize to petition the government, in a society 
where the interests of capital are so well organized and financed, it is imperative 
that workers organize to represent their interests in the legislature.  The services 
provided by public employees are in direct competition for public dollars with 
alternative state purchases and tax breaks for special interests and the public at-
large.[55] These competing interests are well organized and funded in their 
lobbying efforts, including advocates for lower taxes and smaller government in 
general.[56] To attempt to silence public employees or hinder their collective 
public representation[57] will bias future debate over the merits of the services 
public employees provide. 
The fact that public employees have particular interests as employees of the state 
should not disqualify them from collective redress to the government, unless we 
are also willing to disqualify the other lobbyists with direct interests—almost every 
single lobbyist in Washington and our state capitals.  Indeed, it is probably 
important that public employees address their particular interests before the 
government because they have direct experience with the benefits their services 
provide to society and special expertise and experience on how those services can 
best be provided and efficiently administered.  The fact that these employees also 
have a personal interest in higher wages and benefits is completely transparent and 
the compensation they receive is a matter of public record and easily accounted for 
in the public debate. 
Finally, public employees also share interests with private sector employees in the 
general organization of the employment relationship, and society, and these 
interests require representation before the government.  To disadvantage public 
employees in the political debate is to further disadvantage worker interests 
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relative to the interests of management and capital in the formulation of our laws 
and government policies. Even outside of the legislative process, it is important to 
have employee organization for the efficient evolution of legal rules and social 
norms.  Organized groups have “repeat player” advantages and can better litigate 
and lobby to establish precedents and social norms.[58] Employers are certainly 
organized to represent their interests in the legislature and courts, including the 
court of public opinion, and unless employee interests are similarly organized in 
unions, laws, precedents and social norms will evolve in favor of employer interests 
and against employee interests.[59] 
  The Positive View of Public Sector Unions and Collective Bargaining 
Based on the analysis of unions as a collective voice, progressives argue that public 
employee unions are important in ensuring adequate compensation for public 
employees, an adequate level of funding for government services, the efficient 
provision and administration of government services and a voice for employee 
concerns in the legislative process.  Thus they would predict that, although 
organization would increase public employee wages and benefits, that 
compensation would be commensurate to the compensation enjoyed by 
comparable private sector employees, although a larger portion might be received 
in the form of benefits to take advantage of the government’s advantages as an 
insurer.  They would also predict that states with public employee organization 
would have better funded and administered systems for the provision of 
government services.  Finally, they would argue that the legislative activities of 
public employee unions help balance the lobbying activities of other groups 
providing a more balanced perspective on the costs and benefits of government 
programs and providing particular expertise, all of which would tend to improve 
the outcomes of the legislative process. 
Even in an ad hoc analysis, there would seem to be some force behind these 
arguments.  First, the government would seem to enjoy monopsony power over a 
broad array of public employees.   Empirical work supports the notion that the 
government enjoys monopsony power over school teachers and pricing power with 
respect to other professionals it commonly employs.[60] If this is the case, the 
cost-minimizing strategy for the state in providing public services would be to 
choke back employment and wages.  Even where the government does not enjoy 
monopsony power in a labor market, it may acquire the ability to act 
opportunistically with respect to its employees.  Any public employee who invests 
a significant portion of his or her career in acquiring human capital specific to the 
workings of that state would seem vulnerable to later opportunistic behavior by the 
employer. No other employer will reward the public employee for that investment. 
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In light of this economic power over its employees, the political nature of the state 
takes on a different light.  State government can be used as a means for taxpayers 
or consumers and special interests to take advantage of public employees for short-
term gain by reneging on promises that have to be enforced over time.  For the 
efficient enforcement of long-term agreements with the state it is essential that 
such agreements cannot be undone with every change in political power. 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
A.   Wages and Benefits 
There have been a number of recent empirical studies comparing wages and 
benefits in the private and public sector.  These studies take two different strategies 
to account for the differences between private and public employees in education 
and other demographic factors.  One strategy is to compare “similar people” by 
comparing employees with similar educational levels and other demographic 
factors through comparing means for select populations or through regression 
analysis.[61] Alternatively, an analyst might compare “similar positions” by 
comparing what people get paid in the private and public sector for doing the same 
job.[62] The first strategy is far more common because there are many occupations 
that are not well represented in both the private and public sectors and regression 
analysis allows a fairly sophisticated accounting of compensation differences 
between private and public employees.[63] Fortunately, the two methods yield 
similar results.[64] 
Historically, the concern among economists and policy analysts has been whether 
public pay was too low rather than too high.  In evaluating the early empirical 
evidence, Richard Kearney concluded that “[u]ntil the rise of [public sector] unions 
. . . in the 1960s and 1970s, public employees were consistently underpaid relative 
to similar workers in the private sector.”[65] With the advent of significant public 
employee representation in the 1970’s, economists became very interested in the 
comparability of private and public wages and benefits and began trying to 
compare the wages and benefits of workers in similar public and private sector 
jobs.[66] The results of studies using this methodology varied, depending on the 
sample used and the examined worker characteristics.  Dale Belman and John 
Heywood examined variation between private and public employees across seven 
states using Current Population Survey data and found that local government 
employees earned less than comparable private sector workers in six of the states 
and state employees earned less than comparable private sector workers in three 
of the states.[67] George Borjas analyzed private and public sector earnings from 
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the 1960s to 2000 and found that public sector employees suffered lower pay than 
comparable private sector employees; In 2000, men earned about 6 percent less 
in the public sector and women earned about the same in the public sector as the 
private sector when adjusted for demographic characteristics.[68] In a particularly 
detailed analysis of different worker characteristics, Sang-Hyop Lee used National 
Longitudinal Survey data to find that female state employees earned 4 percent less 
than comparable private employees and male state employees earned 9 percent 
less than comparable private employees.[69] Greg Lewis and Chester Galloway 
used detailed census data to examine pay differentials in all fifty states and found 
that both state and local employees were paid less than private employees in 44 
states.[70] They tentatively concluded that “most [state and local governments] 
pay less than private firms in the same state for similar workers.”[71] Finally, in 
perhaps the most complete study comparing pay between occupations in the 
private and public sectors, Michael Miller found that private industry paid better 
for virtually all professional and administrative jobs, but that for technical and 
clerical job levels and blue-collar workers the findings were mixed.[72] Miller’s 
results suggest that at higher skill levels private employees enjoy higher pay, but 
that at low skill levels public employees enjoy higher pay. 
Perhaps the best of the most recent studies on the subject was conducted by Jeffrey 
Keefe.[73] Keefe used Current Population Survey data (wages) and Employer Costs 
of Employee Compensation data (benefits) for the year 2009 to compare private 
and public employee compensation across educational levels and size of firm while 
controlling for a variety of worker characteristics including hours worked, 
education, experience, organizational size, gender, race and disability.  He found 
that public employees are paid wages that are 11.47 percent less than those paid 
comparable private sector employees.[74] Public employees do indeed enjoy 
benefits that are a larger share of total compensation (34.1 percent) than the 
average private sector employer, but only marginally larger than private employees 
with 500 employees or more (33.1 percent).[75] After accounting for public 
employees’ better benefits, Keefe found that they still were paid total compensation 
packages on average worth 3.74 percent less than comparable private sector 
employees.[76] Keefe found that the difference between private and public sector 
compensation varied according to the employee’s level of education with public 
employees with just a high school education or “some college” earning more than 
their private sector counterparts while public employees with a bachelor’s degree 
or an advanced degree earning considerable less.[77] 
Keith Bender and John Heywood have recently confirmed Keefe’s general findings 
on a national basis by examining data from several individual states over a period 
encompassing almost last three decades.[78] Using Current Population Survey 
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data from the years 1983 to 2008, Bender and Heywood found that the 
public/private wage differential for state employees nationally was about -6% in 
1983, closed to a little more than -1% in the early 1990’s, but has since expanded 
to a little more than -11% in the 2000s.[79] The public/private wage differential 
for local employees showed a similar pattern of first narrowing and then widening; 
however local government employees were consistently paid even less than state 
employees.  Bender and Heywood examined CPS on an individual state basis for 
the states of California, Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Florida, and found similar patterns, although for some states the public/private 
wage differential was sometimes positive indicating that the public employees were 
then paid slightly more than their private sector counterparts.[80] The states 
where public employees fared better over the examined period than the national 
public/private wage differential of -11.4 percent were Pennsylvania (-4.5 percent), 
Florida (-4.8 percent), New York (-7.0 percent), California (-9.8 percent) and 
Michigan (-10.1 percent).  In Illinois (-12.5 percent) and Texas (-16.6 percent), they 
fared worse than the national average.[81] 
Keefe has also done studies using Current Population Survey data and Employer 
Costs for Employee Compensation data to compare public and private wages and 
benefits in particular states for the year 2009.  After controlling for education, 
hours worked, experience, organizational size, gender, race and disability, Keefe 
found that New Jersey public employees received 2.25 percent less in wages and 
2.43 percent more in total compensation than comparable private sector 
employees in that state, with neither figure being statistically 
significant;[82] California public employees received a statistically significant 6.36 
percent less in wages and a statistically insignificant 2.29 percent more in total 
compensation than comparable private sector employees in that state,[83] and 
Wisconsin public employees received 4.8 percent less in total compensation than 
comparable private sector employees in that state.[84] 
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Based on the above analyses it seems safe to say that, although union density is 
much greater in the public sector than in the private sector in the American 
economy,[85] public employee unions have not raised the average total 
compensation for public employees to a position of parity with the average total 
compensation of comparable private sector employees. But what has been the 
impact of public sector unions on their members’ wages and benefits in 
comparison with organized private employees and unorganized private 
employees?  Although there is not as much recent empirical work on these 
questions as there is on the public/private pay differential,[86] the work that does 
exist seems to suggest that public sector unions raise both their members’ wages 
and benefits by a modest amount, but not by as much as private sector unions raise 
their members’ wages and benefits.[87] Also like their private sector counterparts, 
public sector unions tend to have a leveling impact on wages, reducing income 
disparities between men and women and majority workers and minority workers, 
and also reducing differences between high and low paid employees.[88] 
Studies have been done on the impact of collective bargaining on particular types 
of public employees, and public employees in general.  Much attention has been 
paid to the impact of collective bargaining on K-12 teachers’ salaries and benefits 
because teachers are a high percent of government employees and often in the 
public eye.  The available studies seem to indicate that the mean wage effect of 
teachers’ unions was about 5 percent in the 1960s and about 7 percent in the 1970s 
– 1990s.[89] Despite this, teachers’ salaries barely kept pace with inflation and 
rose less than other full-time employees during the boom years of the 
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1990s.[90] Less work exists on Police and Firefighters, but the work that does exist 
suggests that organized police enjoy a salary advantage of 4 percent to 8 percent, 
which peaked about 1977 and has declined since then.[91] With respect to state 
employees, early work shows a combined wage and benefits advantage for union 
workers of 4 percent,[92] while more recent work places the advantage at about 7 
percent.[93] After surveying the relevant work, Richard Kearney concluded that, 
although the union advantage in the public sector has varied over time and among 
occupations and geographic regions, but “[t]he best estimate of the overall union 
effect [in the public sector] is probably 5 to 6 percent.”[94] This is well less than 
the usual 10-15 percent compensation advantage attributed to unions in the private 
sector.[95] Given these findings, it seems that, on average, the most that one could 
reasonably expect of collective bargaining in the public sector is that it would help 
public employees reach a rough parity in compensation with private sector 
employees. 
B.  Productivity 
As previously discussed there are divergent views on the impact of unions on the 
productivity of public employees and the efficiency of the agencies which employ 
their members. Detractors argue that unions impose high wages causing inefficient 
production and consumption.[96] They also argue that unions impose inefficient 
work rules and interfere with management’s flexibility in determining how to 
undertake production.[97] Supporters of collective bargaining argue that higher 
wages attract superior workers and decrease turnover costs, increasing 
productivity.  Moreover they argue that public sector unions sometimes counter 
employer monopsony power and can raise efficiency by raising wages and 
employment closer to efficient levels.[98] Supporters also argue that unions 
provide employees with a collective voice so that they can act as an effective 
monitor of management, make positive contributions to improving productivity, 
negotiate and enforce efficient contract terms and further reduce 
turnover.[99] These arguments would seem particularly true where the employees 
are professional employees well trained in the conduct of their craft, for example 
teachers.  Much less empirical work has been done on these questions, but there 
are some relevant empirical findings to discuss. 
The primary argument that unions promote inefficiency is that unions raise wages 
to inefficient levels, thus causing inefficient production and consumption.  Since 
public sector unions typically achieve only a rough parity with comparable private 
sector workers in the total compensation their members receive, it would seem that 
there is little, if any, inefficiency caused by public sector union wages.  Indeed, 
Richard Kearney has observed that, at least among teachers, public sector unions 
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have been more concerned with maintaining or increasing employment than 
increasing wages.[100] This behavior seems more consistent with the argument of 
proponents of collective bargaining that public sector unions bargain with a 
monopsonist employer and can increase efficiency by increasing both wages and 
employment.[101] Increasing the number of teachers lowers the student teacher 
ratio, a primary determinant of the  effectiveness of our schools.[102] Detractors 
might argue that our schools employ too many teachers, and unions make this 
problem worse, but this argument is both increasingly difficult to make, and I have 
yet to see it cogently articulated.  Thus, by trying to maintain or increase teacher 
employment it would seem that teachers’ unions seek to improve school efficiency. 
On the question of whether public sector unions impose inefficient work rules, the 
current debate has been replete with numerous anecdotes but very short on hard 
empirical evidence.[103] Detractors of collective bargaining have argued that 
unions decrease efficiency: by negotiating seniority and just cause provisions 
which limit the employer’s discretion in discharging or laying off employees; 
resisting merit pay provisions that could encourage employee productivity; and by 
resisting technological or other changes that impact employment.[104] For 
example, in the Indiana debate over teacher collective bargaining, Republicans 
argued that seniority rules in collective agreements were inefficient because they 
required schools to lay off meritorious younger teachers and retain less 
meritorious senior teachers.[105] Furthermore, they argued that merit pay was 
necessary to encourage increased teacher productivity.[106] As a result, the 
legislature adopted, and Governor Mitch Daniels signed, a statute prohibiting 
seniority provisions and requiring merit pay.[107] But these arguments ignore that 
there are costs, as well and benefits to such provisions.  Seniority provisions are 
common in both the public and private sectors, even among unorganized 
employers.  This is because seniority provisions allow employers to make credible 
promises to pay deferred wages that promote efficient monitoring and efficient 
employee investment in human capital.[108] Without seniority provisions, future 
school administrators will be tempted to meet short-run budgeting constraints by 
reneging on long term implicit contracts and laying off senior workers, not because 
they aren’t good employees, but merely because their wages are higher because 
they include deferred compensation.  While such opportunism may meet short 
term budgeting demands, in the long-run it will discourage good teachers from 
entering the profession.  Although some use of merit pay may be useful, the idea of 
merit pay was rejected by School Boards nation-wide in the 1950s, well before 
teacher organization, because it was subject to racial and gender discrimination 
and favoritism.[109] There are costs as well as benefits to administrative discretion 
and it is not an easy question whether greater administrative control will increase 
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or decrease public sector productivity.  Whether restrictions on administrative 
discretion decrease or increase public employee productivity and the efficiency of 
their agencies is an empirical question. 
Despite the difficulty of measuring productivity in service industries,[110] several 
scholars have tried to measure the impact of unions on productivity in the public 
sector.   One of the few straightforward measures of productivity in services is the 
mortality rate of heart attack patients in hospitals.  In a 2004 study Michael Ash 
and Jean Seago found that unionization in public hospitals led to significantly 
lower mortality rates.[111] Consistent with this, in an earlier study Charles Register 
found that unionization lead to increased productivity in public hospitals based on 
more mundane measures of patient care.[112] 
The effect of unionization on teacher productivity has been fairly extensively 
studied, primarily using student test scores as the indicator of productivity.  The 
results have been mixed.  In one of the earliest studies, Randall Eberts and Joe 
Stone found that, after correcting for various factors, unionized public schools 
enjoyed student test scores that were 3 percent higher overall, and 7 percent higher 
for average students.[113] These positive results were first hotly contested by 
Michael Kurth,[114] but then supported by later rework of the same data by 
Howard Nelson and Jewell Gould.[115] In her 1996 study, Caroline Hoxby found 
that teachers’ unions increased school budgets and improved the student-teacher 
ratio, but had no positive impact on student test scores.[116] Both before and after 
Hoxby, several studies found positive effects on teacher productivity from 
unionization,[117] while others have found negative effects.[118] If any pattern 
emerges from this collection of results, it seems to be that the unionization of 
teachers increases the test scores of average students, but has little effect on the 
test scores of the highest and lowest performers in schools, and may even hurt the 
performance of low performing students.[119] It is also quite plausible that, as in 
the private sector, the impact of unionization on productivity in the public sector 
depends on the attitude of the parties.  If management and the union are 
recalcitrant and fight, productivity goes down, but if the parties negotiate and work 
cooperatively, productivity can increase.[120] 
 V. CONCLUSION 
These have been contentious times in the long-running debate over the merits of 
public sector collective bargaining.  After several decades in which the question 
seemed largely settled in favor of a system of collective consultation with recourse 
to neutral mediation, fact-finding or arbitration (but largely without a right to 
strike) at the state and federal level, the question has now been reopened in the 
22 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT FALL 2012 
 
debate over how to respond to the recent decline in private employment prospects 
and government revenue.  Although the detractors of public sector collective 
bargaining have alleged that this institution has resulted in public sector wages and 
benefits far out-pacing private sector compensation and significant inefficiencies 
in government administration, neither of these claims seems warranted by the 
existing empirical literature.  When taking into account important differences 
between the public and private sectors, including public employees’ higher 
education levels than their private sector counterparts, recent empirical work 
suggests that collective bargaining has allowed public employees to, at best, keep 
pace with private sector compensation, although, predictably, public sector 
employees take a larger share of their compensation in benefits.  Similarly, 
although there is much less good recent work on the subject, the existing empirical 
research makes it clear that unions typically do not have substantial negative 
effects on public employee productivity, and may even raise productivity in some 
cases.  Moreover there is evidence that public sector unions can have a beneficial 
impact on the programs in which their members work in highlighting the benefits 
of those programs and ensuring more adequate funding.  Although the positive 
view of public sector collective bargaining that previously prevailed in American 
public policy is not always strictly true, it seems to much more closely track the 
available empirical work than the older negative view that has since reemerged in 
American state politics. 
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RECENT  DEVELOPMENTS 
 
BY, STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD: 
Karina Fruin, Daniel Quist, Ryan Thoma, and Daniel Zapata 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of The Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
collective bargaining statutes. 
I.  IERLA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Accretion to an Existing Bargaining Unit 
In Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399 and Western Illinois University, 
Case No. 2011-CA-0106-C (IELRB 2012), the IELRB held that the University did 
not refuse to bargain in good faith when it failed to apply the terms and conditions 
of an existing collective bargaining agreements (CBA) to newly-added positions of 
a bargaining unit. 
The Union represented Western Illinois University employees that fall under the 
title of Maintenance Worker since 1991. In January 2010, six University employees 
in this classification approached the University and sought placement into the 
higher-rated classification of Building Heat/Frost Insulator. In October 2010, 
without notifying the Union, the University reclassified the six employees into this 
higher-rated classification, and in effect promoted the employees out of the 
bargaining unit. The University also made changes to the employees’ break 
schedule and hourly wage. 
The Union, rather than filing an unfair labor practice charge against the University 
for unilaterally changing the terms of the six individuals’ employment, filed a 
majority interest petition with the IELRB seeking to add the new Building 
Heat/Frost Insulator position to the bargaining unit. The Board certified the new 
classification into the bargaining unit on December 15, 2010. 
The Union demanded that the University apply the terms of the existing CBA to 
the new Building Heat/Frost Insulators. However, the University kept in place the 
changes it had made to the employees’ wages and break schedule. On May 15, 2011, 
the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge against the University under 
sections 14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1) of the IELRA, alleging that the University had failed 
to bargain in good faith. 
36 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT FALL 2012 
 
The Board examined past IELRB decisions and analogous cases under the National 
Labor Relations Act to conclude that the University had not violated the 
Act.  Citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), the Board noted that during 
bargaining negotiations, an employer must maintain the status quo regarding 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. If an employer fails to maintain the status quo 
before a contractual agreement is reached, the employer breaches its duty to 
bargain in good faith. 
The IELRB cited Federal-Mogul Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. 343 (1974), for the 
proposition that applying the terms of an existing CBA to employees newly-
accreted to the bargaining unit would be contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding 
in H.K. Porter Co., v. NLRB. 397 U.S. 99 (1970). In H.K. Porter, the Supreme Court 
held that the NLRB could not require an employer or union to agree to substantive 
provisions contained in a collective bargaining agreement. Following this rationale 
in the instant case, the IELRB reasoned that it could not compel the application of 
the CBA to the newly-accreted Building Heat/Frost Insulators. 
In sum, the IELRB held that “when employees are accreted to an existing 
bargaining unit which has a collective bargaining agreement already in place, 
unless that agreement provides otherwise, the employer and the union are 
obligated to bargain regarding the newly-added employees’ terms and conditions 
of employment.” 
B.  Duty to Provide Information 
In Chicago Board of Education and Service Employees International Union Local 
73, Case No. 2011-CA-0088-C (IELRB 2012), the IELRB held that the Chicago 
Board of Education violated sections 14(a)5) and (1) of the IELRA when it refused 
to provide the union with two students’ discipline files.  The union requested the 
information for use in processing a grievance on behalf of a bargaining unit 
member who had been discharged for alleged physical altercations with the 
students.  The union wanted the files to show the students’ pattern of violence and 
inappropriate behavior, and to question the students’ credibility. 
The Chicago Board of Education claimed the students’ records were protected 
private information under the Illinois School Students’ Records Act and the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, and it could not release the files without a 
court order and parental notice.  The Chicago Board of Education defended its 
actions as necessary to maintain student privacy, claiming that this interest 
outweighed the union’s need for the files.  It claimed the union should have sought 
a court order for release of the information, an alternative that would have 
complied with the statutes. 
FALL 2012 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT 37 
 
The IELRA reasoned that the union had an interest is receiving information 
relevant to its performance of its functions as exclusive bargaining 
representative.  Relevancy was determined under a discovery standard, i.e. 
whether it was likely to lead to information that might be admitted at an arbitration 
hearing.  An employer may object to disclosure in good faith based on privacy 
concerns but the privacy exception is construed narrowly. 
The IELRB determined that the Chicago board of Education had a legitimate 
interest in keeping the information confidential, but noted that the union had 
agreed to receive redacted files showing only the students’ first names.  The IELRB 
also noted that the files were only being released to the union, not to the general 
public and concluded that the Chicago Board of Education failed to prove its 
confidentiality defense. 
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
C.  Discrimination 
In County of Cook v. Ill. Labor Relations Bd., 2012 IL App (1st) 111514, 976 N.E.2d 
493 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2012) the First District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB 
Local Panel’s  ruling reinstating two employees with full backpay for an allegedly 
discriminatory refusal to reinstate. The court held that the admission of testimony 
regarding a statement made at a settlement conference was error and that the 
statement, even if properly admitted was insufficient to prove Cook County acted 
with antiunion animus in refusing to reinstate one of two terminated employees 
during settlement negotiations. 
The incidents giving rise to this case began in 2008, when background checks were 
ordered on all employees and volunteers at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary 
Detention Center (JDTC) pursuant to a federal court order. Following this order, 
two nurses assigned to the JDTC, Beverly Joseph and Leslie Mitchner, were 
discharged for gross insubordination when they each refused to authorize the 
required background checks. Joseph and Mitchner grieved their terminations and 
an arbitrator rendered an award in favor of Cook County, finding that the employer 
had just cause to discharge the employees for insubordination. 
Prior to arbitration, during settlement negotiations, a Cook County human 
resources (HR) employee met offered to reinstate Joseph, but not Mitchner; the 
union rejected the settlement offer. The union representative alleged that she 
asked the HR employee if Cook County would not reinstate Mitchner because she 
filed 14 or 15 grievances in a single day. The human resources representative 
responded, “yes.” 
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An ALJ found that Cook County was motivated by antiunion animus when it 
initially terminated Joseph and Mitchner and when the employer refused to offer 
reinstatement to both nurses during settlement negotiations. The Local Panel 
rejected the ALJ’s recommended decision that both nurses were initially fired for 
anti-union animus. However, two members of the Panel concurred with the ALJ 
that both employees were not reinstated at the settlement conference due to 
antiunion animus. The third-member of the Panel dissented.  The ILRB ruled both 
employees should be reinstated with full backpay and benefits, contingent on the 
employees authorizing and passing the required background checks. Cook County 
appealed the Board’s split decision. 
The Appellate Court began its analysis by noting that the ILRB’s decision to 
reinstate both employees necessarily voided the arbitrator’s decision that the 
employees were terminated for just cause, which the Board and courts alike are 
bound to uphold. However, Cook County first raised the argument that the Board 
lacked the ability to reinstate the employees in its reply brief. As a result, the 
employer waived this argument and the court refused to consider it. 
The court observed that a party alleging a discriminatory discharge before the 
ILRB has the burden to establish four elements: (1) the employee is engaged in 
protected union activity; (2) the employer had knowledge of the protected activity; 
(3) the employer took an adverse employment action against the employee; and 
(4) the employer’s action was motivated by the employer’s animus towards the 
employee’s protected union activity. The court noted that there was no dispute 
between the parties that the employees engaged in union activities or that the 
employer had knowledge of these actions. While Cook County conceded that the 
employees’ initial terminations were adverse employment actions, but both parties 
failed to address whether failure to reinstate the nurses during settlement 
negotiations also constituted an adverse employment action. 
The court refused to rule on whether the employer actually committed an adverse 
employment action in this case because the parties had not argued it. The court 
proceeded with its analysis of the issues assuming there was an adverse 
employment action, because there could not be a violation of sections 10(a)(1) or 
(a)(2) otherwise. 
The Court reversed the reinstatement of the two employees for failure of 
admissible proof that an unfair labor practice had occurred. The Illinois 
Administrative Code requires that the rules of evidence and privilege as applied in 
civil cases in circuit courts of Illinois be followed in administrative 
hearings.  However, Section 11(a) of the IPLRA states that in Board hearings all 
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parties are only bound by the rules of privilege recognized by law. Despite this 
language, the ILRB’s own rules provide that “the Administrative Law Judge will, 
insofar as practicable, apply the rules of evidence applicable in Illinois Courts.” Ill. 
Adm. Code 1200.130 (2012). The court found the Board’s own rules are controlling 
and, therefore, both the ALJ and the Board should have applied the rules of 
evidence applicable in Illinois courts but failed to do so. 
As a general matter, Illinois courts do not admit matters concerning settlement 
negotiations because admitting such evidence would have a chilling effect on 
settlement negotiations and negotiations during settlement do not constitute 
admissions of guilt. Illinois courts have long applied Federal Rule of Evidence 
(FRE) 408, which severely limits the admissibility of statements made during 
settlement negotiations. Further, the ILRB’s own policy provided identical 
protection to statements made during settlement negotiations as provided for in 
FRE 408 under 80 Ill. Adm. Code 1200.120 (2010). 
Under FRE 408, statements made during settlement negotiations are prohibited 
from being admitted as proof for the validity of the claim. As a result, the HR 
employee’s statement cannot be admitted as proof of the alleged unfair labor 
practice.  The HR employee who allegedly made the statement during negations 
also did not testify as a witness before the ILRB and therefore could not qualify 
under any exception embodied in FRE 408(b). The court to conclude that the HR 
employee’s statement during the settlement negotiations was inadmissible under 
both the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ILRB’s own rules. 
The court continued that even if the HR employee’s statement was admissible, it 
alone was an insufficient basis for establishing the employer’s liability. First, any 
animus exhibited by the HR employee was irrelevant, because he had no decision-
making authority. It was undisputed that the Director was the sole decision-maker 
regarding the determination to initially discharge the employees and the decision 
not to offer reinstatement to both nurses. The statement made by the HR employee 
during settlement negotiations did not relate to whether the Director acted out of 
anti-union animus.  There was no evidence showing that the Director spoke with 
the HR employee before the negotiations or any evidence that the Director was in 
any way motivated by animus. Further, both nurses engaged in exactly the same 
protected activities, the filing of multiple grievances, but no evidence accounted 
for why Cook County was willing to offer reinstatement only to Joseph. 
As a result, the Court concluded even if the statement made during settlement 
negotiations was admissible, it was an abuse of the Board’s discretion to establish 
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Cook County’s liability for the unfair labor practice charge based on this statement 
alone. 
D.  School District Peace Officers 
In Board of Education of Peoria School District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of 
Support Staff, 972 N.E.2d 1254 (Ill. App. 4th Dist. 2012), the Fourth District 
Appellate Court held that the Peoria School District may proceed in Circuit Court 
on its complaint that Public Act 96-1257 violated the state constitutional 
prohibition against special legislation.  Public Act 96- 1257 amended the IPLRA to 
include within its coverage “peace officers employed by a school district in its own 
police department in existence of the effective date” of the act.  Peoria was the only 
school district that employed its own police force. 
The relevant effect of PA No. 96-1257 on labor relations concerns employees’ right 
to strike.  Generally, both the IPLRA and IELRA permit employees to strike when 
collective bargaining breaks down.  However, the IPLRA precludes public 
employees employed as security personnel, peace officers, or firefighters from 
striking and instead provides for interest arbitration between them and their 
employers. 
The Peoria School District maintained that PA No. 96-1257 violated the state 
constitutional prohibition against special legislation, which prohibits the 
legislature from making classifications that arbitrarily discriminate in favor of a 
select group.  The court found no fundamental right or suspect class was affected 
by PA No. 96-1257 and, thus, applied the “deferential rational basis test.”  In 
applying this test, the court found that the complaint alleged facts that, if proved, 
would show that PA No. 96-1257 arbitrarily discriminates in favor of a select 
group.  Specifically, the court found the following to be relevant distinctions made 
by PA No. 96-1257: (1) between peace officers employed by plaintiff and any peace 
officers who may be employed directly by other school districts in the future; and 
(2) between plaintiff and any school district that, in the future, may employ peace 
officers directly. 
Despite agreeing that the state has a legitimate interest in treating all police officers 
similarly, with respect to the right to strike, the court held that Peoria raised a 
legitimate concern that the statutory distinctions are not rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.  The court found that the act could not rationally account 
for the identified distinctions between (1) the statute’s treatment of officers 
currently employed by school districts and those who may be employed by other 
school districts in the future and (2) its corresponding treatment of the school 
districts employing such officers. 
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In essence, the understood took the language of PA No. 96-1257 to mean that that 
any officers directly employed by school districts other than the plaintiff in the 
future would remain under the purview of the IELRA, not the IPLRA.  Thus, those 
future officers would be allowed to strike but not to go into interest 
arbitration.  The court noted that if the state’s legitimate objective was to ensure 
that police officers, no matter who employs them, are not allowed to strike, then 
the distinction between police employees of school districts currently employing 
police officers and those of school districts that may employee police in the future 
is irrational.  Hence, the court found that PA No. 96-1257 did not further a 
legitimate state interest and that the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to make 
out a claim that the amended Public Labor Relations Act constituted special 
legislation. 
  
